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Abstract
Aims
Social scientists have postulated that the discrepancy between achievements and expecta-
tions affects individuals’ subjective well-being. Still, little has been done to qualify and quan-
tify such a psychological effect. Our empirical analysis assesses the consequences of
positive and negative affective forecasting errors—the difference between realized and
expected subjective well-being—on the subsequent level of subjective well-being.
Data
We use longitudinal data on a representative sample of 13,431 individuals from the German
Socio-Economic Panel. In our sample, 52% of individuals are females, average age is 43
years, average years of education is 11.4 and 27% of our sample lives in East Germany.
Subjective well-being (measured by self-reported life satisfaction) is assessed on a 0–10
discrete scale and its sample average is equal to 6.75 points.
Methods
We develop a simple theoretical framework to assess the consequences of positive and neg-
ative affective forecasting errors—the difference between realized and expected subjective
well-being—on the subsequent level of subjective well-being, properly accounting for the
endogenous adjustment of expectations to positive and negative affective forecasting errors,
and use it to derive testable predictions. Given the theoretical framework, we estimate two
panel-data equations, the first depicting the association between positive and negative affec-
tive forecasting errors and the successive level of subjective well-being and the second
describing the correlation between subjective well-being expectations for the future and
hedonic failures and successes. Our models control for individual fixed effects and a large
battery of time-varying demographic characteristics, health and socio-economic status.
Results and conclusions
While surpassing expectations is uncorrelated with subjective well-being, failing to match
expectations is negatively associated with subsequent realizations of subjective well-being.
Expectations are positively (negatively) correlated to positive (negative) forecasting errors.
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We speculate that in the first case the positive adjustment in expectations is strong enough
to cancel out the potential positive effects on subjective well-being of beaten expectations,
while in the second case it is not, and individuals persistently bear the negative emotional
consequences of not achieving expectations.
“The less you expect, the more you’ll be pleased”
Lyrics from the song “Less”, Ben Harper & The Innocent Criminals, 1999.
Introduction
Expectations do matter in life. They represent a reference according to which individuals evaluate
their economic, social and psychological conditions, and make important prospective decisions
[1]. For instance, expectations and aspirations play a crucial role in determining investment in
education [2,3], consumption choices [4], bequests decisions [5], and long-term career choices [6].
By modifying how experiences and subjective conditions are framed and contextualized
[7–9], expectations may also affect subjective well-being judgments. Becoming aware of the
discrepancy between what an individual achieved and her initial expectations may change the
way in which she interprets life events, evaluates her subjective conditions and revises her life
plans [10–13]. For instance, Sen [8,9] argues that the experience of negative conditions may
push individuals to adjust their desires to contextual constraints, thereby “deforming” their
expectations in response to realized life events.
The aim of our contribution is to investigate the consequences that the discrepancy between
expectations and realizations of subjective well-being exerts on its subsequent level.
We depict a simple and stylized model of subjective well-being formation relying on a set of
well-known economic and psychological assumptions, that will be amply discussed in the next
pages. Net of the effects of both economic (such as labor market status and income) and non-
economic (including socio-demographic and health conditions) factors [14–18], subjective
well-being also depends on how individuals perceive to have performed relative to some initial
expectation. Individuals suffer a loss of well-being from realizing to have failed to achieve what
initially expected, while they enjoy an extra source of well-being in case they realize to have
outperformed their target [19–21]. The extra gains and losses of well-being produced by the
discrepancy between realizations and expectations depends on two additional elements. First,
individuals might conceive achievements and failures differently, being more sensitive and
assigning higher importance to either one of the two outcomes [22,23]. Second, expectations
are not static, but instead adjust along with achievements and failures: they are revised up in
case individuals have outperformed, while they are revised down in case individuals have failed
to reach their initial expectations [24,25].
Our empirical analysis addresses three relevant research questions that are related to the
assumptions and implications of our model and which, in our opinion, are still open in social
sciences.
Q.1. Is there any association between affective forecasting errors and
subjective well-being?
Wilson and Gilbert [26] define affective forecasting as people’s predictions about future feel-
ings, and call affective forecasting error the observed discrepancy between expected and real-
ized feelings.
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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Theoretical contributions postulate that affective forecasting errors impact on individuals’
subjective well-being [19–21]. For instance, Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory [27] postulates
that emotional discomfort arises if the actual self does not match the ideal self. Still, little has
been done to qualify and empirically quantify such a psychological effect. As pointed out by
Wilson and Gilbert [26], “most of the early work (. . .) measured people’s forecast but not their
actual emotional response” (p.346).
In order to fill this gap, we use microdata from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP,
[28]). This unique dataset is representative of the German population and collects longitudinal
information on respondents’ characteristics, their expectations about future life satisfaction
and the subsequent life satisfaction realizations. These two variables can thus be matched to
compute affective forecasting errors about subjective well-being as the difference between real-
ized and expected life satisfaction, allowing us to understand how positive or negative errors
are correlated with future life satisfaction.
In a seminal paper based on the SOEP dataset, Schwandt [29] finds that people systemati-
cally mis-predict their subjective well-being over the life cycle: they expect–incorrectly–
increases in young adulthood and decreases during old age. These findings provide supporting
evidence for theories explaining the age U-shape in well-being with unmet expectations.
In line with the recent empirical literature in economics, psychology, and sociology, we
measure subjective well-being with self-reported overall life satisfaction [14,25,30]. Therefore,
we will henceforth consider the terms “subjective well-being” and “life satisfaction” as syno-
nyms, and use them interchangeably.
Given these considerations, the first testable prediction we investigate is whether, even after
controlling for individual fixed effects, a number of time-varying characteristics of respon-
dents measured at the time of the expectation formulation, and their evolution up to the reali-
zation of life satisfaction, affective forecasting errors are correlated with individual subjective
well-being. Thus, rather than contributing to the extensive literature on the determinants of
faulty affective forecasting, we are mainly interested in estimating its net association with sub-
sequent well-being.
It is worth noticing that we discuss our empirical results in terms of correlations–not of
causal effects–because, even if we control for individual fixed effects, a number of time-varying
characteristics of respondents measured at the time of the expectation formulation, and their
evolution up to the realization of life satisfaction, there is still the possibility that negative
unobservable shocks affecting well-being can be more persistent than positive ones, which
would make individuals have both unmet expectations and lower life satisfaction in the next
period, but not the other way around. This is a remaining empirical difficulty that we can
hardly overcome. Still, in the robustness section we discuss a placebo exercise that shall help to
dispel this concern.
Previous empirical studies mainly focus on the role played by income expectations in deter-
mining subjective well-being [12,22,31–35], and this approach has undoubtedly produced
meaningful conclusions. For instance, it provides a simple and appealing explanation for the
(almost) flat relationship between subjective well-being and the per-capita level of GDP that is
empirically observed in developed nations [36,37].
Nevertheless, “money is not enough to make people happy” and, in addition to income,
there are other important non-economic dimensions that play a crucial role in determining
subjective well-being [14–18]. In this perspective, overall subjective well-being can be
described as a weighted average of satisfaction with several economic and non-economic
aspects of life [38]. Thus, as much as they do with income, it is reasonable to believe that indi-
viduals evaluate achievements relative to previous expectations about overall well-being, that
are formulated by considering economic as well as non-economic life domains. To understand
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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whether expectations about income or non-income related aspects of life are the relevant ones
for well-being, in an extension to our analysis, we compare results of our main specification–
that uses affective forecasting errors defined in terms of subjective well-being–and of a second
one, that considers the well-being consequences of discrepancies between pay rise expectations
and realized changes in labor income.
Q.2. Does the association with subjective well-being change between
positive and negative affective forecasting errors?
The magnitude of the psychological response to affective forecasting errors might depend on
the sign of the discrepancy between actual conditions and expectations. The differential effects
of achieving or missing expectation is central in the disappointment theory presented by
Loomes and Sugden [23]. According to this theory, when facing an uncertain outcome, an
individual formulates prior expectations on its realization. Then, after the uncertainty is
resolved, the individual experiences an extra gain of utility (due to elation) if the outcome is
better than what expected, while she bears an extra loss of utility (due to disappointment) if
she finds her situation to be below the prior expectations. There is no reason to expect the two
additional components of utility to be symmetric in size. Indeed, there is robust evidence sug-
gesting that individuals are loss averse [22]: for a shock of given size, the loss in well-being
registered when the shock is negative and, relative to an initial reference, associated with dete-
riorated conditions is greater than the gain in well-being when the shock is positive and associ-
ated with improved conditions.
Boyce at al. [39] study the association between income changes and subjective well-being.
They show that income losses exert a larger effect on well-being than equivalent income gains,
and conclude that loss aversion does not only represent an affective forecasting error [40] but
also applies to experienced losses.
In our context, these considerations would suggest that “unmet” expectations (i.e. the level
of life satisfaction achieved by the individual falls below her own expectations–a negative affec-
tive forecasting error) should be more strongly correlated with well-being levels than “beaten”
expectations (i.e. the level of life satisfaction achieved by the individual overcomes her own
expectations–a positive affective forecasting error).
Q.3. Is there any empirical association between affective forecasting errors
and subjective well-being expectations for the future?
Expectations (on future levels of subjective well-being) are not fixed, rather, they represent an
endogenous reference that adjusts over time to life events, to smooth out the psychological
responses to achievements or failures. Economists talk of reference-dependent preferences: the
utility of a choice depends on the comparison between the corresponding outcome and the ref-
erence which, in turn, coincides with her (endogenous) equilibrium rational expectation about
its level [41]. More related to the aim of this study, in discussing the “aspirations treadmill”,
Kahneman and Kruger [25] postulate that “if people gradually adjust their aspirations to the
utility that they normally experience, an improvement of life circumstances would eventually
lead them to report no higher life satisfaction than they did before, even if they were experienc-
ing higher utility than previously” (p.16). Similarly, Easterlin [24] posit that an increase in
income leads to small and transitory improvements of life satisfaction, because income aspira-
tions move in parallel with income levels. Sometimes, social scientists refer to this psychologi-
cal adjustment process with the expression “preferences drift” [42].
Supporters of hedonic adaptation have provided robust evidence showing that individuals
adapt faster to improved conditions than to unfavorable circumstances [43,44,45,7]. In our
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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analysis, we explicitly consider whether there is any correlation between surpassed and unmet
past expectations about life satisfaction and subjective well-being expectations for the future.
Theoretical framework
Let St be individual’s realized life satisfaction for period t. Deaton [10] argues that the evalua-
tion of subjective well-being is a relative one, as people compare their situation with a subjec-
tive benchmark, a “shifting standard” that depends on one’s expectations and past experiences.
We follow this suggestion and postulate that realized life satisfaction depends on its latent
dimension—St —and on the affective forecasting error S

t   Et  1ðStÞ according to the following
equation:
St ¼ S

t þ d
þ
1½St   Et  1ðStÞ > 0 þ d
 
1½St   Et  1ðStÞ < 0: ð1Þ
In Eq 1, δ+ and δ− are a positive and a negative coefficient that can be of different absolute
magnitude: our specification allows positive and negative affective forecasting errors to affect
realized satisfaction differently, in line with prospect theory and the idea of loss aversion. For
simplicity and consistency with our empirical analysis, we consider simple indicator functions
for positive and negative affective forecasting errors, but it would make no qualitative differ-
ence if they entered linearly in the model.
The remaining ingredients of our theoretical model are the specifications for latent life sat-
isfaction—St —and for life satisfaction expectations– Et−1(St).
Simplifying the formulation proposed by Schwandt [29], we let latent satisfaction St be
described as follows:
St ¼ gðxtÞþf
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0 þ f
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0: ð2Þ
As in Schwandt [29], satisfaction depends on a set of (observable and unobservable) charac-
teristics of individuals, summarized by g(xt). Additionally, we posit that individuals suffer or
gain satisfaction if–in the previous period–they enjoyed a lower or higher level of satisfaction
than they expected. Even in this case, we allow for asymmetric effects of positive and negative
forecasting errors on latent satisfaction (f+ and f−). For simplicity, and unlike Schwandt [29],
we exclude previous affective forecasting errors from the determination of latent satisfaction at
time t. It is worth noticing that we treat differently affective forecasting errors at t-1 and at t in
the determination of satisfaction. In fact, our framework is based on the assumption that the
former affects latent satisfaction directly, while the latter matters only once latent satisfaction
judgments are formulated and individuals finalize their evaluation of satisfaction by compar-
ing their current latent status with their expectations about it, as described in Eq 1.
Finally, as done by Schwandt [29], we also assume that expectations formulated at time t-1
about life satisfaction at time t are a function of satisfaction at the time of the forecast—St−1–
but we assume that that they also depend on the affective forecasting error realized in the pre-
vious period. That is to say, individuals learn from their past affective forecasting errors to
when updating their expectations about the future. Again, we allow for positive and negative
affective forecasting errors to matter asymmetrically in affecting expectation updating (β+and
β−). Hence, we posit the following specification for Et−1(St):
Et  1ðStÞ ¼ oSt  1 þ b
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0 þ b
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0 ð3Þ
The solution of the model is obtained by substituting Eq (2) and Eq (3) into Eq (1). If we do
so, we obtain the following specification for St:
St ¼ gðxtÞþf
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0 þ f
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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þd
þ
 gðxtÞþf
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0 þ f
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0
  oSt  1   b
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0   b
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0

> 0 ð4Þ
þd
 
 gðxtÞþf
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0 þ f
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0
  oSt  1   b
þ
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ > 0   b
 
1½St  1   Et  2ðSt  1Þ < 0

> 0:
In Eq (4), positive and negative affective forecasting errors at time t-1 influence realized life
satisfaction at time t by three channels:
1. First, as shown by the first line of Eq 4 they have a direct impact by the effect of the mis-
matches onto current latent life satisfaction (Eq 2).
2. Second, the effect of the mismatches onto current latent life satisfaction (Eq 2) also comes
into play in the two terms that describe the comparison between latent and expected satis-
faction at time t, pre-multiplied by δ+ or δ−, pictured in the second and third line of Eq 4.
3. Third, affective forecasting errors matter in the comparison between latent and expected
satisfaction at time t not only because they influence St , but also because they are used to
update expectations Et−1(St).
In our empirical analysis, we will estimate two sets of parameters. First, we will estimate the
overall effects of positive and negative affective forecasting errors at time t-1 onto realized life
satisfaction at time t, that is, a stripped-down version of Eq 4. Second, we will estimate how
expectations about future life satisfaction formulated at time t-1, when the affective forecasting
errors are realized, are affected by these forecasting errors, as portrayed by Eq 3. Needless to
say, we cannot aim at estimating Eq 1 or Eq 2, as they involve the latent–and unobservable–
term, St . Hence, we will not be able to distinguish empirically between the first two channels
depicted by the model.
Methods
The data
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative annual
panel survey of the German population, interviewing every year around 7,000 households
(13,000 individuals). It started in 1984 in West Germany and in 1990, after German re-uni-
fication, in East Germany. The SOEP collects a wealth of information about subjective well-
being: individuals are asked every year about their current satisfaction with many life domains
(health, income, leisure, . . .) and about satisfaction with life in general. Our analysis is based
on the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984–2012, version 29, SOEP, 2013 (doi:
10.5684/soep.v29). The SOEP is approved as being in accordance with the standards of the
Federal Republic of Germany for lawful data protection, and all participants gave free and
informed consent to participate in the survey. The survey ethics are monitored by an indepen-
dent advisory board at the DIW—Berlin. The authors (who are not affiliated to DIW) signed a
contract with the data holders to permit the use and publishing of data for scientific purposes.
Interested researchers can access the data conditional on application. Details about the applica-
tion process can be found at https://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.222829.en/access.html
Life satisfaction and affective forecasting errors. The unique feature of this dataset is
that, from 1991 until 2004, individuals were also consistently and repeatedly asked about their
expected life satisfaction in five years’ time. The exact wording of the questions in English is as
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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follows: “How satisfied are you at present with your life as a whole?” and “How satisfied do you
think you will be five years from now?”. Individuals were asked to report their answer according
to a 0–10 scale, where 0 means ’completely dissatisfied’ and 10 means ’completely satisfied’.
Hence, we can match data for life satisfaction in year t with data on expectations about life sat-
isfaction in year t expressed in year t-5, for each year t from 1996 until 2009 and for each indi-
vidual that is present in both periods. By computing the difference between expectations and
realizations, we can understand whether each individual’s current life satisfaction is below, in
line with, or above the level he or she was aspiring to five years before.
Let the level of life satisfaction at period t be St, and let life satisfaction expectations for
period t expressed in period t-5 be E½St  5t . We consider individual life satisfaction expectations
to be unmet, met, or beaten if St < E½S
t  5
t ; St ¼ E½S
t  5
t , or St > E½S
t  5
t , respectively. We thus
consider expectations to be beaten when individuals commit a positive affective forecasting
error, met when there is no forecasting error, and unmet if the forecasting error is negative.
Given our data, we are going to evaluate the effect of a positive or a negative difference between
St−1 and E½St  6t  1, our treatment variables, on the subsequent life satisfaction realization, St, and
on E½St  1tþ4, the life satisfaction expectations expressed at time t-1. As a consequence, we con-
sider only individuals for whom we observe St, E½St  1tþ4; St−1 and E½S
t  6
t  1, restricting our sample
to years t = 1997, . . ., 2005. The timing of our analysis is reported in Fig 1.
Our choice of comparing expected and realized emotional states is consolidated in the psy-
chological literature studying validity and precision of affective forecasting, namely how indi-
viduals formulate predictions about their future ’feelings’ (for an extensive survey, [26]). For
instance, by comparing–as we do–expected and realized feelings, this literature has highlighted
that while people are particularly skilled in predicting the valence (either positive or negative)
and the emotional specificity (the specific nature of the future emotional reaction) of future
feelings, they are less accurate in predicting the intensity and duration of these emotional
states. More related to our case, several previous studies have already used the SOEP matched
life satisfaction expectations-realizations data that we also exploit. One example is Frijters et al.
[46], who show that East Germans overshoot their happiness expectations about the 1989 Ger-
man unification. The second is Abolhassani and Alessie [47], who show that unemployed indi-
viduals expect to be less satisfied with life than they will actually be in the future, while the
same does not hold for retirees. Third, Schwandt [29] shows that the observed U-shaped age
Fig 1. Timing of the analysis. Timing of our analysis of the consequences of positive and negative affective forecasting errors on
future life satisfaction levels and on life satisfaction expectations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.g001
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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profile of life satisfaction can be explained by unmet targets. Similarly, Lang et al. [48] study age-
differential accuracy in anticipation of future life satisfaction. Finally, [49] show that people sys-
tematically mis-predict the impact of life events such as marriage, widowhood, unemployment
and disability on subjective well-being, and that this is partly driven by unforeseen adaptation.
While most of these studies focus on the determinants of the mismatch between expectations
and realizations, we are instead interested in its effect on future life satisfaction, and we explicitly
allow for the interplay between achievements and expectations of life satisfaction.
Using data from the Gallup World Poll in which people self-report evaluative well-being
today and five years from now by answering to a standard Cantril ladder question, Deaton
[50] shows that, in spite of repeated evidence to the contrary, people consistently predict they
will be better off in the future. The gap between future and current well-being diminishes with
age, and in rich countries, becomes negative among the elderly.
Demographic characteristics and other controls. We also make use of information on
age, that enters in our model as a quadratic; interview year dummies (to avoid issues of multi-
collinearity due to age-period-cohort under-identification, we group together the first two
years, i.e. 1997 and 1998); a variable counting the number of evaluations of life satisfaction
expressed by the individual until any given year, that we call “evaluation experience” and that
controls for learning effects; a dummy for residing in East Germany; years of education;
employment status (dummies for full- or part-time employment, unemployment, retirement–
the excluded category being out of the labor force); civil status (dummies for being married,
divorced, widowed, the excluded category being single); number of children; objective health
indicators (dummies for any doctor visits or any overnight hospital stay in the previous year, a
dummy for having a statement of disability); net household income. Our control variables are
measured at time t-6, when the affective forecasts were expressed. In addition, to take care of
the improving or deteriorating trajectories in objective circumstances of individuals between
the time of the formulation of expectations and the subsequent realization of life satisfaction,
we also explicitly include variables indicating the experience of the event measured by each of
the control variables between these two time periods. To give an example, we construct a
dummy equal to 1 if an individual experienced any episode of unemployment between t-5 and
t-1. We proceed analogously for all other covariates, with the exception of age–as its change is
mechanical–and survey year and evaluation experience, that we measure at time t. In addition,
since education and household income are continuous variables, we simply control for the
level of these two variables at t-6 and t-1. Finally, for number of children we include whether
any new child is born between t-5 and t-1.
Income expectations. In an extension of our main analysis, we also use information
about the self-reported probability of having a pay rise within the next two years, that we
match with information on labor income changes for the corresponding time span. We con-
sider income expectations to be “unmet” if individuals expected a pay rise with a positive prob-
ability and did not experience a positive change in labor income, and “beaten” if they did not
expect a pay rise and instead got a positive labor income change. Similarly to the previous case,
in this analysis we will consider how (not) getting a pay rise expected at time t-3 for t-1 affects
life satisfaction levels at time t and life satisfaction expectations at time t-1.
Sample selection. The final sample for our main analysis is composed of an unbalanced
panel of 75,231 observations for 13,431 individuals. This stems from the following sample
selection rules:
1. Keep only time-t observations for years 1997–2005 (178,592 observations–initial sample)
2. Keep only observations with non-missing data about life satisfaction at t (178,167
observations).
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
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3. Keep only observations with non-missing data about life satisfaction expectations expressed
at t-6 for t-1 (85,342 observations).
4. Keep only observations with non-missing data about life satisfaction at t-1 (83,947
observations)
5. Keep only observations with non-missing data about life satisfaction expectations expressed
at t-1 for t+4 (82,998 observations)
6. Keep only observations with non-missing data about any other covariate used in the analy-
sis (75,231 observations)
Our sample is smaller for the income expectations analysis, as pay rise expectations were
consistently asked only to employed individuals interviewed in two specific years within our
sample (t-3 = 1999 and 2001). The final sample in this case is composed of 12,105 observations
for 8,362 individuals.
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for our sample are shown in Table 1. Close to 52% of individuals in our
sample are females, average age at the time when the expectations about life satisfaction is
expressed is 43 years, 27% of our sample lives in East Germany, and the average years of educa-
tion is 11.4. In terms of employment status, 62% of the sample is employed full-time, 3% is
employed part-time, 7% is unemployed and 9% is retired. The average log net household
income is 7.53 points. The distribution of civil status is as follows: 62% is married, 6% is
divorced and 5% is widowed. The average number of children is 0.71. In the year before the
interview, 58% of the sample went to the doctor at least once and 10% experienced an over-
night hospital stay, while 12% of the sample has a disability statement. Descriptive statistics for
the evolution of these variables between t-6 and t-1 are also reported in Table 1, where we also
report the descriptive statistics for unmet and beaten income expectations, that we use in an
extension to our main analysis. Finally, individuals carried out an average of 4 evaluations
before expressing St.
Our main outcome variable is self-reported life satisfaction at time t, St. It has an average of
6.75, and its standard deviation is equal to 1.77. Our second outcome variable is E½St  1tþ4, that
has a mean of 6.78 and a standard deviation of 1.94. For descriptive purposes, the histograms
of the distributions of these two variables are respectively reported in Panels A and B of Fig 2.
We characterize positive and negative affective forecasting errors with two dummy vari-
ables, Unmeti,t−1 and Beateni,t−1. These are equal to one for a negative or a positive affective
forecasting error, i.e. a negative or a positive difference between St−1 and E½St  6t  1. The average
of this difference is equal to -0.24, with a standard deviation of 2.00. The histogram of this vari-
able is reported in Fig 3, and confirms that the distribution of affective forecasting errors is
skewed to the left. Overall, there are 43% of cases unmet expectations and 31% of cases of
beaten expectations. Therefore, individuals formulate correct affective forecasts in 26% of
cases.
The correlation between St−6 and E½St  6t  1 is positive and equal to 0.68. This means that, on
average, individuals with higher baseline life satisfaction have a tendency to express higher
expectations about future life satisfaction. One way to interpret this very high correlation
could be that individuals have adaptive expectations are adaptive, that is, that E½St  6t  1 ¼ St  6 +
e, where e is a random error term. Indeed, under the assumption that individuals have fully
adaptive expectations, in a robustness test we also substitute E½St  6t  1 with St−6 when we compute
the mismatch variables, and find comparable results (detailed estimation outcomes are
Subjective well-being and affective forecasting errors
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941 March 7, 2018 9 / 22
available from the authors). On the other hand, although still positive, the correlation between
St−6 and St−1 is lower, at 0.45. Table 2 shows the distribution of the beaten and unmet variables
by St−6, the level of life satisfaction when the expectations were expressed. The pattern that
emerges from this analysis is not surprising: given their tendency to express high expectations,
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Mean Standard Deviation
Aget-6 42.9 15.6
Female 0.52 0.50
East Germanyt-6 0.27 0.45
Years of educationt-6 11.4 2.46
Employed full timet-6 0.62 0.49
Employed part timet-6 0.03 0.18
Unemployedt-6 0.07 0.25
Retiredt-6 0.09 0.29
log(Net household income)t-6 7.53 0.49
Marriedt-6 0.62 0.49
Divorcedt-6 0.06 0.24
Widowedt-6 0.05 0.21
Number of children t-6 0.71 0.99
Any doctor visitt-6 0.58 0.49
Any overnight hospital stayt-6 0.10 0.30
Disability statement t-6 0.12 0.32
St 6.75 1.77
E½St  1tþ4 6.78 1.94
St  1   E½S
t  6
t  1 -0.24 2.00
Unmet life satisfaction expectations 0.43 0.49
Beaten life satisfaction expectations 0.31 0.46
Evaluation experiencet 4.03 2.28
Ever lived in East Germany between t-5 and t-1 0.28 0.45
Ever been employed full time between t-5 and t-1 0.72 0.45
Ever been employed part time between t-5 and t-1 0.10 0.30
Ever been unemployed between t-5 and t-1 0.16 0.37
Ever been retired between t-5 and t-1 0.15 0.36
Ever been married between t-5 and t-1 0.74 0.44
Ever been divorced between t-5 and t-1 0.10 0.30
Ever been widowed between t-5 and t-1 0.07 0.25
Any child born between t-5 and t-1 0.13 0.34
Any doctor visit between t-5 and t-1 0.94 0.24
Any overnight hospital stay between t-5 and t-1 0.37 0.48
Ever had a disability statement between t-5 and t-1 0.19 0.39
Years of educationt-1 11.6 2.50
log(Net household income)t-1 7.62 0.50
Unmet income expectations 0.13 0.33
Beaten income expectations 0.36 0.48
Notes: the table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. The number of
observations is 75,231. Beaten and unmet income expectations are computed in the sub-sample of employed
individuals present in t-3 = 1999 and 2001. The number of observations in this subsample is 12,228.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.t001
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individuals with progressively higher levels of baseline life satisfaction are more likely to expe-
rience unmet expectations, and vice-versa. Hence, individuals with unmet expectations are
positively selected with respect to their baseline life satisfaction, and vice-versa.
To understand the patterns of beaten and unmet expectations by other individual charac-
teristics at the time when expressing the forecast, Table 3 reports their distribution according
to age (below or above the median of 43 years), employment status (full-time employed vs.
other), civil status (married vs. other), and overall health (disabled or not). The message deliv-
ered by this Table is similar to the one for baseline life satisfaction: likely because of their
higher initial expectations, individuals with initially better conditions (younger, full time
employed, married, not disabled) are the ones who are more likely to experience unmet and
less likely to experience beaten expectations–suggesting positive selection into unmet expecta-
tions, and vice-versa. However, the magnitude of these differences is rather small.
Finally, in Table 4 we provide a descriptive outlook of the relationship between changes in
some objective circumstances and unmet/beaten expectations. Following Odermatt and Stut-
zer [49], we report the distribution of beaten and unmet expectations for individuals who:
Fig 2. Empirical distributions of St and E½St  1tþ4. Empirical distributions of St (A) and E½S
t  1
tþ4 (B) in our sample. The number of observations is 75,231.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.g002
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• were single at t-6 and got married between t-6 and t-1—or not
• were married at t-6 and became widowed between t-6 and t-1—or not
• were full-time employed at t-6 and experienced unemployment between t-6 and t-1—or not
• were not disabled at t-6 and became disabled between t-6 and t-1—or not
As one would expect, those staying single, experiencing widowhood, unemployment and
disability are more likely to have unmet expectations. The opposite does not hold, however, as
in all cases except for unemployment these groups are also the ones more likely to experience
beaten expectations. This is likely happening because these groups also have lower–and there-
fore easier to beat–expectations. Again, however, the differences are in most cases small in
magnitude.
All in all, these descriptive facts highlight that–to understand the consequences of positive
and negative affective forecasts on future life satisfaction—it is important to take into account
Fig 3. Empirical distribution of the affective forecasting error St  1   E½S
t  6
t  1. Empirical distributions of the affective forecasting error St  1   E½S
t  6
t  1 in our sample. The
number of observations is 75,231.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.g003
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of differences in individual characteristics at the time of the forecast and their changes over
time, as these are likely correlated with both affective forecasting errors and life satisfaction.
Empirical model
The aim of our empirical analysis is to provide first-pass empirical evidence on whether there
are differential correlations between last-period unmet or beaten life satisfaction targets and
one-period-ahead life satisfaction. We also assess whether there is a correlation between last-
period unmet or beaten life satisfaction targets and last-period life satisfaction expectations for
the future—contemporaneously with the realization of the met/unmet variable.
To do that, we estimate two panel-data equations, the first depicting the association
between positive and negative affective forecasting errors and the actual level of life satisfaction
and the second describing the correlation between well-being expectations and hedonic fail-
ures and successes.
Table 2. Distribution of beaten and unmet expectations by the baseline level of life satisfaction St-6.
St-6 % beaten % unmet
0 0.64 0.18
1 0.64 0.22
2 0.62 0.25
3 0.55 0.28
4 0.50 0.33
5 0.47 0.30
6 0.39 0.39
7 0.31 0.42
8 0.23 0.46
9 0.18 0.57
10 0.16 0.57
Notes: the table reports the distribution of Beaten and Unmet expectations by the baseline level of life satisfaction St-
6. The number of observations is 75,231.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.t002
Table 3. Distribution of beaten and unmet expectations by a set of observable characteristics at t-6.
% beaten % unmet
Age
Less than 43 years 25% 50%
43 years or more 38% 36%
Full-time employed
Yes 29% 45%
No 35% 40%
Married
Yes 29% 46%
No 33% 41%
Disabled
Yes 32% 43%
No 31% 43%
Notes: The number of observations is 75,231.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.t003
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The estimation of two different models for life satisfaction and for the expectations about
life satisfaction is motivated by the findings by Frijters et al. [46] and Schwandt [29], who have
shown that the differences between expectations and realizations of life satisfaction can be sys-
tematically predicted by information that is available at the time of the forecast–namely age
and educational level–providing empirical evidence against the hypothesis of rational expecta-
tions [51] for life satisfaction.
The main difficulty with the interpretation of our estimated associations between affective
forecasting errors and life-satisfaction concerns unobserved heterogeneity. First, comparability
of self-reported life satisfaction across different individuals is hampered by issues of differential
item functioning [52], as the interpretation of a life satisfaction scale may differ across individ-
uals [53]. Furthermore, latent traits of individuals that are constant over time may determine
both their life satisfaction levels and their propensity to report high or low expectations about
future life satisfaction. Finally, as shown in the previous section, the omission of individual
traits that change at the same time as the beaten/unmet expectation patterns could lead us to
estimate biased associations between positive/negative forecasting mismatches and subsequent
life satisfaction levels. For instance, a negative shock that has a long lasting effect on life satis-
faction–like the onset of disability–could decrease life satisfaction both in the current and in
the future period. If not properly controlled for, these persistent shocks would generate a spu-
rious negative association between unmet expectations and one-period-ahead life satisfaction.
We solve issues of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effects panel data
models, that allow us to purge our estimate from time-invariant individual traits. Assuming
that reporting styles are constant within individuals and over time [54], inclusion of individual
fixed effects also solves issues of differential item functioning. On the other hand, time-invari-
ant covariates like gender and country of birth are absorbed by the individual fixed effects. We
also control for a rich battery of individual time-varying observable covariates, described
above and measured at t-6 –when expectations were expressed. These controls help us to par-
tial out the heterogeneity in observable individual characteristics at the time of formulating
expectations. Additionally, to explicitly take into account that positive or negative affective
forecasting errors may be actually related to an underlying improving or deteriorating trend in
objective circumstances–as described by the disability example above–we also include controls
Table 4. Distribution of beaten and unmet expectations for individuals becoming married, widowed, unemployed
and disabled between t-6 and t-1.
% beaten % unmet
Single at t-6, becomes married
Yes 25% 48%
No 26% 49%
Married at t-6, becomes a widow
Yes 36% 43%
No 33% 41%
Employed at t-6, experiences unemployment
Yes 28% 52%
No 29% 44%
Not disabled at t-6, becomes disabled
Yes 34% 44%
No 31% 43%
Notes: The number of observations is 69,197.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.t004
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for the evolution of these same covariates between t-6 and t-1 –when life satisfaction is realized.
Although we would never be sure that we have included all potential sources of spurious corre-
lation, we are confident that our set of controls is very comprehensive, and that it includes the
most relevant life events that have been proven to be related to life satisfaction by previous
empirical literature [55]. Even after including all the controls at t-6 and their evolution
between t-6 and t-1—negative unobservable shocks affecting well-being can be more persistent
than positive ones, which would make individuals have both unmet expectations and lower life
satisfaction in the next period, but not the other way around. This is a remaining empirical dif-
ficulty that we can hardly overcome. Therefore, we will interpret all our results in terms of
associations, and avoid to give causal interpretations to the estimated coefficients. Still, in the
robustness section we discuss a placebo exercise that shall help to dispel this concern.
Formally, we estimate the following system of 2 equations:
Si;t ¼ a1i þ b
1
1
Unmeti;t  1 þ b
1
2
Beateni;t  1 þ X
0
i;t  6g
1 þ DX0i;t  1y
1
þ x
1
i;t
E½St  1i;tþ4 ¼ a
2
i þ b
2
1
Unmeti;t  1 þ b
2
2
Beateni;t  1 þ X
0
i;t  6g
2 þ DX0i;t  1y
2
þ x
2
i;t
The first equation is related with life satisfaction levels at time t, while the second regards
life satisfaction expectations at time t-1. In each equation, the αi are individual fixed effects,
Unmett−1 and Beatent−1 are two dummy variables defined above for unmet and beaten expecta-
tions (the reference group being meeting one’s expectations), the vectors Xt−6 and ΔXi,t−1
respectively include the time varying covariates measured at t-6 and their evolution up to t-1,
as described above. Finally, x
j
i;t; j ¼ 1; 2 represent an error term: since the same respondent
appears in our data multiple times, we always cluster standard errors at the individual level.
We estimate the system depicted above equation-by-equation: since the same right-hand side
variables appear in both models, joint estimation would lead to equivalent estimates [56].
Finally, we have performed cluster-robust Hausman tests to verify the plausibility of fixed
vs. random effects models, and the tests always reject the random effects specification with
p< .01.
Results
Main results
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 5, where we report the estimates of coeffi-
cients b
1
1
; b
1
2
; b
2
1
and b
2
2
obtained from our data. The first two columns show results for St and
E½St  1tþ4 when we do not include the controls in vectors Xt−6 and ΔXi,t−1, while the last two col-
umns show the same results when these controls are included. The estimated coefficients for
Unmett−1 and Beatent−1 do not change across the two blocks of columns. This fact suggests
that the associations that we pin down are robust to the confounding effect of the covariates
included in the model. Looking at Column 1 and 3, we find that there is a negative correlation
between the level of life satisfaction in the next period, St, and failing to meet life satisfaction
expectations (without controls: b
1
1
= -0.073, p< 0.01; with controls: b
1
1
= -0.071, p< 0.01),
while there is no correlation between going beyond one’s expectations and life satisfaction
(without controls: b
1
2
= 0.019, p> 0.1; with controls: b
1
2
= 0.016, p> 0.1). This evidence con-
firms the asymmetric relationship between affective forecasting errors and life satisfaction
highlighted in the model. We also test for equality of magnitude of the coefficients related with
Unmett−1 and Beatent−1 (H0: b
1
1
¼   b
1
2
) and reject the null with a p-value of 0.02.
As suggested by the theoretical model, one possible mechanism behind this result could be
asymmetric rescaling of expectations as a result of beaten and unmet targets. We investigate
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this possibility in Column 2 and 4, where our dependent variable is the life satisfaction bench-
mark people set for the future, E½St  1tþ4, after reporting St−1. We find that expectations are posi-
tively correlated to positive forecasting errors (without controls: b
2
2
= 0.475, p< 0.01; with
controls: b
2
2
= 0.473, p< 0.01), and negatively correlated to unmet expectations (without con-
trols: b
2
1
= -0.646, p< 0.01; with controls: b
2
1
= -0.643, p< 0.01). In line with our theoretical
framework, the previous findings can be rationalized as follows: although the estimated corre-
lation between past beaten expectations and current expectations for the future is (in absolute
value) smaller than in case of unmet expectations (the difference is statistically significant with
p<0.01), in the first case the adjustment in expectations (the third channel by which affective
forecasting errors affect life satisfaction in the model) is strong enough to cancel out the poten-
tial positive effects of beaten expectations (that consists of the joint effect of the first two chan-
nels) on life satisfaction. Instead, in the second case it is not, and individuals persistently bear
the negative emotional consequences of not achieving expectations.
Extensions
Satisfaction with life as a whole can be described as a weighted average of satisfaction with sev-
eral economic and non-economic aspects of life [38]. It would therefore be interesting to
understand whether beaten or unmet expectations about economic or non-economic aspects
of life are driving our findings. In an attempt to answer this question, we replicate our main
analysis focusing on beaten and unmet expectations about income, defined as described above.
These regressions are structured like our main analysis, but include among the controls a
dummy indicating whether individuals were expecting or not a pay rise with positive probabil-
ity and the realized levels of individual labor income at t-3 and t-1.
Of course, we would like to carry out a similar analysis about other economic and non-eco-
nomic life domains (such as employment, occupation choice, family relations, health, . . .) but
our data only provide consistent longitudinal information about expectations and realizations
of this specific dimension of life.
Table 5. Association between unmet and beaten life satisfaction expectations, St and E½St  1tþ4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome variable: St E½St  1tþ4 St E½S
t  1
tþ4
Unmet l.s.exp.t−1 -0.073 -0.646 -0.071 -0.643
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Beaten l.s.exp.t−1 0.019 0.475 0.016 0.473
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age quadratic Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Observations 75,231 75,231 75,231 75,231
Individuals 13,431 13,431 13,431 13,431
Notes: All models control for individual fixed effects, a quadratic polynomial in age and year dummies. Models in Columns (3) and (4) also control for the covariate
vectors Xt−6 and ΔXi,t−1, described in the text. Number of observations and individuals stated at the bottom of each column. Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level in parentheses.
 p<0.01
 p<0.05
 p<0.1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.t005
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Results are reported in Table 6. On the one hand, there is weakly significant (0.1 < p<
0.05) evidence that the “satisfaction treadmill” is at work for income expectations, as there is a
positive correlation between higher life satisfaction expectations and surpassing their income
expectations, but not vice-versa (without controls: b
2
1
= 0.013, p> 0.1 and b
2
2
= 0.206, 0.1<
p< 0.05; with controls: b
2
1
= 0.024, p> 0.1 and b
2
2
= 0.197, 0.1< p< 0.05). On the other hand,
neither positive nor negative mismatches between income expectations and realizations corre-
late with future life satisfaction (without controls: b
1
1
= 0.028, p> 0.1 and b
1
2
= 0.078, p> 0.1;
with controls: b
1
1
= 0.004, p> 0.1 and b
1
2
= 0.096, p> 0.1).
Robustness tests
In S1 File, we present some sensitivity tests to our main empirical results, that we describe
here. For all robustness tests we report only the estimated coefficient for the models including
all covariates–as in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 –but results are unchanged when we
exclude them–as in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.
First, in our main analysis we have used categorical indicators for beaten or unmet expecta-
tions. However, it is not granted that unmet and beaten expectations dummies represent
reverse forecasting errors of the same strength. For example, it could be that positive forecast-
ing errors represent on average greater absolute errors than negative forecasting errors. There-
fore, as a robustness test we consider a specification where, instead of the dummies, we use a
linear spline in the value of the difference between life satisfaction realizations and expecta-
tions, with a knot at a difference of zero. As shown in Table A in S1 File, the patterns we detect
are analogous to the ones using the categorical indicators We tested for difference in slopes
between the positive and the negative segments, and we can reject the null of equal trends with
p<0.01 for both St and E½St  1tþ4. We also experimented with non-linear specifications where–
instead of including a linear spline–we have included dummies for each quartile of the
Table 6. Association between unmet and beaten income expectations, St and E½St  1tþ4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
St E½St  1tþ4 St E½S
t  1
tþ4
Unmet income exp.t−1 0.028 0.013 0.004 0.024
(0.104) (0.116) (0.104) (0.116)
Beaten income exp.t−1 0.078 0.206 0.096 0.197
(0.108) (0.115) (0.109) (0.114)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age quadratic Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other covariates No No Yes Yes
Observations 12,105 12,105 12,105 12,105
Individuals 8,362 8,362 8,362 8,362
Notes: All models control for individual fixed effects, a quadratic polynomial in age, year dummies, log of income at t-3 and t-1, and for the income expectations
expressed at t-3 for t-1. Models in Columns (3) and (4) also control for the covariate vectors Xt−6 and ΔXi,t−1, described in the text. Number of observations and
individuals stated at the bottom of each column. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
 p<0.01
 p<0.05
 p<0.1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192941.t006
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positive-negative mismatch. Results (available from the authors) suggest that the linear specifi-
cation provides a good approximation of the empirical relationships investigated.
Second, as shown in Table B in S1 File, the patterns we have shown are stable across the
general population, as our findings are robust to dropping people aged 65+ from our sample,
and we obtain similar results also when we split the sample between males and females or drop
observations for which the value of expected life satisfaction is either 0 or 10, as individuals
cannot fail to meet expectations equal to 0 and cannot beat expectations equal to 10.
As interview dates are not random–in Table C in S1 File we replicate our analysis and
include as additional controls in our model the distance (in days) between (i) the date when
St-1 is realized and the date when Et-6(St-1) was expressed and (ii) the date when St is realized
and the date when St-1 was realized (only in the model for St). Although the number of obser-
vations differs because of missing data in interview dates, results are wholly consistent with
our baseline. Results still hold if we use non-linear functions of these distances.
Third, since Schwandt [29] highlights how affective forecasting errors are more negative
early in life and turn positive later on, we are particularly concerned that a kink in well-being
around a threshold age may be driving our results. Although our baseline specification already
controls for a quadratic trend in age–therefore allowing for a non-linear relationship–to
address this concern we also show in Table D in S1 File that our results are not qualitatively
affected when we allow for a fully flexible specification for age, that includes either age dum-
mies or age-by-gender dummies. In addition, results for this more demanding specification
are unchanged even when we only focus on working age (25–65) respondents.
A fourth issue about our design concerns expectation updating. In fact, our main explana-
tory variables depend on the differences in achieved life satisfaction and the expected life satis-
faction measure from five years before. By using the latter as our benchmark, we are implicitly
assuming that individuals do not adapt their expectations in the meantime. However, individ-
uals may get feedback on their expectations and achieved well-being every year (every second,
actually) and adjustments of expectations may happen during the five year period, rendering
our chosen benchmark outdated. To understand whether expectation updating can invalidate
our empirical conclusions, we proceed in two steps. First, we rely on SOEP data for year 2008,
when respondents were asked to express expectations about life satisfaction in both 1 and 5
years in the future. In this data, the correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.83.
Indeed, for 85% of respondents the expectation for t+1 is in a 1-point interval around the
expectation for t+5, and the two expectations correspond exactly for 55% of respondents. This
evidence suggests that–when thinking about expected life satisfaction—respondents may not
have in mind a precise time horizon, but think about a generic “future” period. Having verified
this first point, we can then go back to our original data and match expectations expressed a t-
2 for five years in the future—E½St  2tþ3—to life satisfaction in t-1, and repeat our analysis. If
expectation adjustments were a major issue, then using our specification based on the 5-year
lagged expectation (E½St  6t  1Þ or the one based on 1-year lagged expectations (E½S
t  2
tþ3Þ should
produce different results. Instead, if the two specifications lead to similar results then the role
of expectation adjustments is minor in explaining our findings. Table E in S1 File reports
results of our main analysis when we use 1-year lagged expectations (the different number of
observations is due to missing values). Results are fully comparable to those considering the
5-year lag, confirming that–if anything–expectations updating plays a minor role in explaining
our findings.
As already discussed in the previous pages, a final issue about our interpretation of the neg-
ative association between unmet expectations and subsequent life satisfaction realizations con-
cerns the possibility that—even after including all the controls at t-6 and their evolution
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between t-6 and t-1—negative unobservable shocks affecting well-being can be more persistent
than positive ones, which would make individuals have both unmet expectations and lower life
satisfaction in the next period, but not the other way around. This is a remaining concern for
the interpretation of our estimated associations as causal effects. To indirectly dispel this con-
cern, we have devised a placebo test. On the one hand, if the effect of unmet expectations was
only due to a stronger persistence of unobservable negative shocks to life satisfaction, then it
should be also detected when the realized level of life satisfaction is matched to a randomly
drawn expectation, as the only genuine determinant of a possible mismatch in this simulated
setup is the realized level of life satisfaction. On the other hand, since a randomly assigned
expectation is surely uncorrelated with life satisfaction, we should find a zero unmet effect if
this was not due to asymmetric persistence of shocks. To perform this test, we have carried out
a set of 1,000 random permutations of the expectation target (E½St  6t  1) within our sample.
For each permutation, we have computed the beaten and unmet variables comparing the ran-
domly drawn target, E½St  6t  1; with the realized level of life satisfaction, St−1, and we have re-esti-
mated the model. Since our focus is on the persistency of negative shocks to life satisfaction,
we only consider the equation for St in this analysis. Table F in S1 File reports the median
Unmett  1ðb
1
1
Þ and Beatent  1ðb
1
2
Þ coefficients that results from the 1,000 permutations, with
their respective empirical confidence intervals at the 5% level of significance. Since neither b
1
1
nor b
1
2
are statistically different from zero, this placebo test does not lend empirical support to
the hypothesis that our uncovered asymmetric affective forecasting error effects are due to the
fact that negative shocks to life satisfaction have stronger and more persistent effects than posi-
tive ones.
Discussion and conclusion
Social scientists have theorized that subjective well-being is a relative concept, that also
depends on the discrepancy between its realization and an expected level [19–21]. Our study
develops a simple theoretical framework to discuss the matter, and reports preliminary empiri-
cal evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
We find that the discrepancy between expected and realized levels of life satisfaction per se
is significantly correlated with the subsequent well-being level, even after controlling for indi-
vidual characteristics and potential biases in reporting styles. By so doing, we provide the first
empirical evidence on people’s emotional response to beaten or unmet affective forecasts [26].
We have also put forward a number of additional research questions to qualify the uncovered
correlations and understand the main mechanisms at work. First, we have investigated the
asymmetric correlation of beaten and unmet expectations with subjective well-being. In this
respect, our results suggest that while going beyond one’s expectations is uncorrelated with
subjective well-being, becoming aware of a negative discrepancy between actual and expected
well-being is significantly and negatively correlated with its subsequent realizations.
Second, our results are supportive of the idea that that individuals tend to revise their tar-
gets of subjective well-being along with achievements and failures: future expectations are pos-
itively correlated with beaten past expectations, and negatively correlated with unmet past
targets. While the adjustment in expectations appears to be strong enough to cancel the corre-
lation of beaten expectations with subjective well-being, results support the idea that individu-
als fail to entirely internalize unmet targets, thus exhibiting a higher emotional sensitivity to
negative affective forecasting errors.
Third, in an attempt to characterize whether our results are due to mismatches in expecta-
tions and realizations about economic, non-economic or both domains of life, we replicate our
analysis using mismatches between income expectations and realization. On the one hand, we
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find that surpassing income expectations is positively correlated with expectations about future
subjective well-being, highlighting how beaten expectations about economic aspects of life
matter in terms of shaping expectations. On the other hand, discrepancies between expected
and realized income do not correlate with subjective well-being levels, therefore suggesting that
negative mismatches between expectations and realizations on variables concerning non-
income aspects of life are responsible for the uncovered negative correlation of negative fore-
casting errors with future well-being.
Our results suggest that the pursue of high expectations on subjective well-being—likely
to be unmatched by future conditions—will hurt long-run life satisfaction. This finding also
provides empirical support in favor of the link between unmet aspirations and subsequent
happiness that was hypothesized by Schwandt [29]. In this vein, Van Dijk et al. [57] report
experimental evidence showing that subjects deliberately tend to lower their expectations
about obtaining a desired but uncertain outcome in order to avoid future disappointment.
Low expectations on subjective well-being—likely to be beaten by subsequent realizations—
will not pay-off either, as they would be adjusted upwards before leading to true gains in sub-
jective well-being.
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